Pothecary Witham Weld Solicitors

Saturday 4th February 2012
You are here  : Home Legal Updates
Legal Updates
Planning for Charities Seminar Notes Print

EMPLOYMENT LAW

JERRY HAWTHORNE 

One of the most recent radical developments affecting employers and employees was the repealing in April 2009, of the controversial Dispute Resolution Regulations which had been brought into effect in October 2004.  These Regulations had been brought in with a view to encouraging employers and employees to settle their disputes internally thus reducing the number and cost of public Employment Tribunal hearings.  The Regulations which were abolished in April 2009 were compulsory and there were potentially large financial penalties for failures to comply with them.  The compulsory procedures proved an abject failure. 

Read more... [Planning for Charities Seminar Notes]
 
New Inheritance Tax Liabilities for Trusts - 5th April 2008 Deadline for Change Print

Finance Act 2006 – 5th April 2008 is last chance to change Trusts and avoid new Inheritance Tax liabilities.

Trusts have traditionally been taxed for Inheritance Tax (“IHT”) purposes depending on the terms of the trust. Historically trusts have been divided in this regard into three classifications: Interest in Possession Trusts, Discretionary Trusts, and Accumulation and Maintenance Trusts.

Read more... [New Inheritance Tax Liabilities for Trusts - 5th April 2008 Deadline for Change]
 
Ministers of Religion - Servants of God or of Man? Print

Employee Status for Ministers of Religion?

The traditional position that Ministers of religion could not be “employees” for the purposes of employment protection legislation such as the recent Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) had been affirmed in cases such as Davies and Presbyterian Church of Wales 1986, The President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt CA 1984, and the Diocese of Southwark and Others v Coker 1998. In the latter case the view of the Employment Tribunal (“ET”) Chairman, when Dr Coker an assistant Curate made a complaint to the Croydon ET of unfair dismissal against the Church of England, was, allowing Dr Coker’s claim, that “the relationship between a Curate and his God is a matter separate from his relationship with his Church. I have great difficulty in seeing why the spiritual nature of his work should preclude the existence of a contract of employment”. Overruling the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”), and holding that Dr Coker was not an employee for Employment Law purposes, the Court of Appeal ruled that there was no binding contract between Dr Coker and the Bishop as there was no intention to create legal relations. Similarly, in October 1995 the Norwich ET ruled against the Reverend Kit Chalcraft, a Church of England Minister, who had been dismissed after announcing his intention to marry for a third time. The Reverend Chalcraft complained to the ET hoping for a Reinstatement Order; they decided that they had no jurisdiction to hear his complaint, and agreed with the Bishop, that Reverend Chalcraft was an office holder with a licence to minister, rather than an employee for the purposes of unfair dismissal, although Perkin v St George’s Charitable Foundation EAT 2005 affirms that “it is of course trite law that a person may be both an office holder and an employee”, as does the House of Lords in the case of Reverend Percy and The Church of Scotland 2005.

The more widely reported case of the Reverend Ray Owen, who unsuccessfully in the High Court in April 2000 sought to obtain a judicial review of the decision taken by his Bishop not to renew his appointment as Rector of Hanley in Stoke on Trent, is interesting, as it provides clues as to MEPs’ views about Ministers who seek recompense through the Courts for civil matters. There, the Reverend Owen presented a petition to the European Parliament following a decision from the High Court, that although the Bishop had not followed proper procedures set out in Reverend Owen’s contract it was clear that exactly the same decision would have been reached had the right procedures been followed. Although the European Parliament voted in favour of a resolution “urging all parties to this dispute to resolve their differences in the spirit of reconciliation and understanding which is the way of the Church, and which corresponds to the basic principles on which democracy is founded and preserved within the European Union”, they accepted that “members of the clergy should enjoy the same human rights as other citizens of the European Union” and they acknowledged that common and ecclesiastical law “fail to provide essential rights to the clergy to which they should be entitled, notably the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in cases of dispute.” They further added that they accepted the arguments that it was not always appropriate “to afford certain types of workers – such as the clergy and elected representatives – the same fora for redress as other economically dependent workers.” They noted that no breach of EU law had taken place.

Two new important cases dawning in the Courts and ETs, presaged possible changes in the traditional position that Church clergy should be regarded as servants of God rather than of man. In the first of those cases, in December 2005, the House of Lords, decided that the relationship between the Church of Scotland and The Reverend Helen Percy, constituted “employment” for the purposes of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (“the SDA”). Although, the relationship was not considered in the context of unfair dismissal, the House of Lords held that the relationship did constitute “employment” for the purposes of s 82 (1) of the SDA, which gives a wider meaning to “employment” than applies to unfair dismissal questions under the ERA. “Employment” under the SDA is defined as “employment under a contract of service or of apprenticeship or a contract personally to execute any work or labour” whereas, the more restrictive definition of “employee” under the ERA is: “an individual who has entered into or works under (or,  where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment” ERA s 230 (1). Reverend Percy’s case was that she suffered sex discrimination at the hands of the Church by, she claims, it effectively forcing her to resign after she was said to have had an affair with a married individual in her parish. She argued that the stance that the Church adopted and the action they took against her had not been the same as that taken against male ministers, who were known to have had extra marital relationships. Although Reverend Percy dropped her earlier claim for unfair dismissal, two of the five Law Lords suggested that the traditional position of Ministers not being regarded as employees for the purposes of unfair dismissal might need to be reconsidered; Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated that in his view “it is time to recognise that employment arrangements between a church and its ministers should not lightly be taken as intended to have no legal effect and, in consequence, its ministers denied [this] protection”.

A reconsideration of the traditional position occurred in October 2006 where it was held that a Minister of the New Testament Church of God based in Harrow, North West London, was an “employee” of that Church within the meaning of the ERA and could properly claim unfair dismissal. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Employment Appeal Tribunal and found also that Reverend Stewart was an “employee” for the purposes of unfair dismissal. The relevant facts are that Reverend Stewart was ordained and carried out duties as a Minister of the Church, and for his particular Church in Harrow, indeed Lord Justice Pill commented that “the duties as pastor at Harrow were found to be substantial, although a discretion in the manner of performance was present, as would be expected. The standards to be expected of a pastor, and guidelines as to what the pastor was expected to do, are set out in the minutes. There was an obligation to report regularly to the national office”. The duties of the Minister in question, that is his work in Harrow, were very particularly controlled by that Church. Although ETs have regularly held that whether tax and NI arrangements are not determinative of employment, a side issue in Stewart was that he was receiving payment through the Church’s payroll system on a PAYE basis. The Court carefully considered that Percy almost reversed the traditional thinking of the relationship of a Church with its Ministers and held that in Reverend Stewart’s case, the financial arrangements and duties of Reverend Stewart provided for sufficient mutuality of obligation for a contractual employee/employer relationship. They concluded that what follows from Percy as guidance for ETs is, that the presumption that for Ministers of religion there is no intention to create legal, contractual relations should be largely ignored, and the ET’s role is to fact find as to whether a contract existed and if that contract is or was a contract of employment. In Stewart, the Court of Appeal explored the application of Article 9 of the Human Rights Act with regard to the respect that must be given to the faith and doctrine of the particular church, but nevertheless found in Reverend Stewart’s favour holding that “if the relationship between church and minister has many of the characteristics of a contract of employment in terms of rights and obligations, these cannot be ignored simply because the duties are of a religious or pastoral nature”.

That said, each faith and relationship between Ministers and Churches will vary greatly and each case will be determined on its own facts. The case of Stewart highlights the need not to ignore the potential for a contractual relationship between Minister and Church, and the many characteristics of an employee relationship that that has, simply because the individual is engaged in providing services of a religious kind. Contrary to popular belief the decision in Stewart does not have the result that all Ministers of Religion are simply now employees. The decision was as a result of the particular facts of that case. Lord Justice Pill explained that the ruling “does not involve a general finding that ministers of religion are employees. Employment Tribunals should carefully analyse the particular facts, which will vary from church to church, and probably from religion to religion, before reaching a conclusion”.

Undeniably, many Ministers relationships with their Church are factually similar to that of employee and employer. The guidance is that for each relationship, the Church, and an ET, should look very carefully at the circumstances, for instance the arrangements for salary/stipends, the control which the individual has over their own work, the disciplinary procedures adopted by the Church and the organisation generally of the Church. One particular matter which ET’s will consider in detail for the purposes of finding whether or not a contract existed, is the consideration given by both parties. For most Ministers, the consideration from each side would seem apparent. In exchange for performing objectives set by the Church many Ministers will receive remuneration and accommodation. However, for the Brothers and Sisters of Religious Orders, who take vows of poverty, and adopt a way of life when they become a member of their particular Order, the consideration provided by each side then is not so similar to that of an employee and employer relationship. That said, the position of those members of Religious Orders who accept positions within schools and other institutions particularly where they are remunerated by a Local Authority or other body is likely to be that of an employee. What is not known is how far case law will change the employment rights of Ministers in general, and of those Religious Order members if at all for them. How far also will the ET and the Courts go in ascribing certain ways of life as contractual relationships of employment? Witham Weld which with Pothecary and Barratt was a predecessor firm of PWW, acted in the interesting unreported case of Reverend Father M and the Governors of a Catholic Missionary Institute in 1983, where a Roman Catholic Priest and member of a Catholic religious order who worked as a Maintenance Manager of the Institute but whose salary was paid to his Order, successfully made a complaint of unfair dismissal to the ET against the Institute. The ET held on the particular facts of that case, being the existence of a job description, the references made by the Institute to Father M’s “employment”, and generally as a result of the “control of the Institute and his working hours and duties [as] defined by the respondents”, that Father Magill was an employee. The Tribunal “did not consider that the applicant’s acquiescing in the payment of most of his remuneration to the [Order] negated the employee relationship”. The position for Roman Catholic Diocesan Priests may raise difficulties. Although sometimes their salaries should they chose to take one maybe capped say at £10,000 and most receive much less than that, similar to other Ministers such salaries could be interpreted as being consideration for services that they provide on behalf of the Church Trustees to their parishioners, and again it is not impossible that the relationship between a Priest and their Diocese could be interpreted as a contract of employment.

For the Methodist Church, the above recent cases will be of interest, although the 1984 case of The President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt, where Pothecary & Barratt represented the Church, may be of more interest as it concerns specifically the Methodist Church, although it does pre date the important Percy case. In Parfitt, the Court of Appeal, when upholding the Methodist Conferences’ appeal against decisions by the ET and EAT for Mr Parfitt, correctly explored whether he had a contract at all with the Church and whether that contract if found could properly be said to be a contract of service, and whether the doctrinal standards of the Church could give rise to a binding contract. Although the case is arguably historic the Court conclusion that Ministers set out to serve God, and that it could not be held that at the point of ordination or any point thereafter that the Minister is entering or has entered into any kind of contract to serve God or the Church, and therefore no employee/employer relationship arose, is not over ruled in Stewart. With regard to the characteristics of a contract of service, Lord Justice Dillion explained that “it is not practicable to lay down a hard and fast list of what is required to constitute a contract of service . . . . . . None the less the Courts have repeatedly recognised what is and what is not a contract of service and I have no hesitation in concluding that the relationship between a church and a minister of religion is not apt in the absence of clear indications of a contrary intention in the document, to be regulated by a contract of service.” The Court also took the view that no doubt binding contracts between the Methodist Church and its Ministers existed for instance the compulsory superannuation scheme, but decided that those did not form any part of a contract for service, either when on entry into full connexion or on appointment to a particular circuit. Lord Justice Dillion also took the view that no doubt contracts of service exist between the Methodist Church and individuals such as “secretaries or caretakers”, however he claimed that because of Mr Parfitt’s “spiritual position and functions as a Minister” he was in a “very different position” from those persons employed by the Church or any Circuit under a contract of service. The Parfitt case, although particular to the Methodist Church, must be read in light of the more recent cases of Percy and Stewart – it remains to be see what effect those decisions will have on Methodist Ministers, and indeed other Church ministers. Since the cases, particularly that of Stewart, have been reported in the mainstream press, Churches, might see an increasing number of Ministers making ET applications. It will be then for an ET to fact find and apply law such as Parfitt, Percy and Stewart to the particular set of circumstances before them.

Possibly for reasons of natural justice some Churches, particularly the Church of England, are moving towards accepting that Ministers are and should be granted the employment protections afforded to employees. Although Section 23 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 refers only to rights under the ERA, the Employment Relations Act 2002, the ERA 1999, and does not cover the discrimination legislation, unless that legislation has been made under s 2 (2) of the European Communities Act 1972, such as the SDA, the Church of England are nevertheless largely recommending that the Government use the power it has under section 23 to grant employment rights to clergy. A meeting of the Church of England General Synod in February 2005 debated the issue and “welcomed the recommendation that Employment Rights under the Employment Relations Act 1999 Section 23 be granted to all clergy.” Furthermore, in April 2007 the second Church Estates Commissioner Sir Stuart Bell confirmed that legislation has been drafted as to terms and conditions of service for ministers but that legislation will not be ready before 2009.

Some Ministers of religion, and their unions, argue that the absence of employment law rights mean that more draconian treatment is exercised when disciplining, and that often the lack of an independent body or forum results in disputes simply not being heard or thoroughly investigated. If Ministers’ positions are terminated they often lose their job, their licence to work, their home, which they argue is a harsher outcome than that experienced by other employees unfairly dismissed. Some are of the view however, that for Ministers of the Christian faith, the understanding when they join the Ministry is that they will follow in the footsteps of the Apostles, leaving behind them worldly matters, including civil protections such as employment law rights. To seek financial or other recompense for what they view to be a wrong doing against them and seeking to argue that a binding, contractual, commercial relationship exists between them and their Church or their God almost contradicts the basis upon which they join or should join their Church.

If more decisions in favour of Ministers are made, then other matters such as Ministers rights under the Working Time Regulations, rights not to work on Sundays under Section 23 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 and whether the necessary continuity of employment, required for unfair dismissal claims, can include time spent in other parishes and Churches, will all no doubt be aired.

11 July 2008

 
Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE) Employment Law Update Print

On 6th April 2006 the new Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 came into force. They replaced the Regulations which had been in use since 1981 but their aim remains the same, namely to ensure that employment rights of all employees of a business being transferred, bind the new owner of a business in the same way as the previous owner was bound.

The 2006 Regulations require the old employer to give the new employer, employee liability information including employees’ ages and identities, salient employment terms; disciplinary, grievance, court or tribunal procedures involving staff during the previous two years together with information about prospective grievances or complaints and details of any collective agreement. Such information should be given not less than fourteen days before the business transfers and in default may be enforced by the transferee referring to an Employment Tribunal. The ET can then make an award of compensation to the new employer of some £500 per employee unless a smaller sum is regarded by the Tribunal as apt.

The 2006 Regulations make plain that they apply to all outsourcing situations as well as more clear cut transfers of businesses or parts.

The volume of case law on TUPE disputes since 1981 is large so a cautious view will be that if there is any doubt about whether TUPE 2006 applies to a particular set of circumstances, the assumption should be that it does.

If the transferring employer does not inform and consult with the employees who are transferring as the Regulations require, it will be liable with the new employer, to compensate affected staff even though the obligation to inform and consult with employees automatically passes to the new employer. In other words under TUPE 2006, the transferor employer will remain liable for the financial consequences along with the new transferee employer.

Dismissals and changes to employment terms remain unlawful under the 2006 Regulations, if connected with the transfer itself unless the employer can show that the reason is; “an economic, technical or organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce”; but a desire to standardise employment terms of new staff taken on as a result of TUPE with those of the transferee’s existing employees does not count as an economic technical or organisational reason.

The 2006 Regulations provide greater flexibility where potentially insolvent businesses are concerned but this aspect of TUPE has been criticised for vagueness.

 
Additional Topical Employment Law issues Print
Summary:
  1. Recruitment
    a. Duty to advertise job vacancies?
    b. Withdrawal of a job offer once accepted?
  2. Contracts of employment and written statement of particulars
  3. Changes to terms of employment
  4. Age discrimination update
  5. Post-termination restrictive covenants
  6. Summary of qualifying periods for employment rights

1. Recruitment

The general rule under English law is that, save in specified situations such as cases which involve the possibility of sex, race, disability or trade union related discrimination, an employer can lawfully refuse to employ a job applicant for any reason whatever.

a. Duty to advertise job vacancies?

There is no general duty on an employer to advertise job vacancies. The Employment Appeal Tribunal has ruled that neither the sex nor the race discrimination legislation impose a specific duty to advertise a position, although a failure to advertise might be taken into account in appropriate cases ICR 507, EAT).

It is unlawful to advertise a job vacancy in a way which indicates the job is only available to members of one of the sexes unless the job can lawfully be offered to members of one sex only or in a way which indicates that colour, race, nationality or ethnic origins will be determining factors unless the circumstance are such that it is lawful for colour, race etc to be used as determining factors for filling the vacancy. There are also advertising rules in relation to Disability Discrimination but in contrast to the equivalent sex and race discriminatory advertisement rules these allow positive discrimination in job advertisements.

Employers should be careful in requiring job-applicants to complete applications in hand-writing as this could amount to discrimination against some disabled people and should make it clear that other forms of application will be acceptable.

b. Withdrawal of a job offer once accepted?

An employment contract has the same legal implications as any other contract. Once an unconditional contract has been agreed it is binding on both parties and any failure to fulfill its terms by either party will be a breach of contract giving the other party the right to sue for any resulting loss.

2. Contracts of employment and written statement of particulars

A contract of employment exists as soon as an employee starts work. Starting work proves that they accept the terms and conditions offered by the employer. Both employer and employee are bound by the terms offered and accepted. Often the contract is verbally agreed and not written down.

Employees are however entitled by law to be given a written statement setting out the "main particulars" of their employment within two months of their start date.

The statement should contain:-

  • the names of the employer and employee,
  • the date when the employment began, and
  • the date on which the employee's period of continuous employment began

    The statement should also contain particulars, as at a specified date not more than seven days before the statement (or the installment containing them) is given, of:

  • the scale or rate of remuneration or the method of calculating remuneration,
  • the intervals at which remuneration is paid (that is, weekly, monthly or other specified intervals),
  • any terms and conditions relating to hours of work (including any terms and conditions relating to normal working hours),
  • any terms and conditions relating to any of the following:
    • entitlement to holidays, including public holidays, and holiday pay (the particulars given being sufficient to enable the employee's entitlement, including any entitlement to accrued holiday pay on the termination of employment, to be precisely calculated),
    • incapacity for work due to sickness or injury, including any provision for sick pay, and
    • pensions and pension schemes,
  • the length of notice which the employee is obliged to give and entitled to receive to terminate his contract of employment,
  • the title of the job which the employee is employed to do or a brief description of the work for which he is employed,
  • where the employment is not intended to be permanent, the period for which it is expected to continue or, if it is for a fixed term, the date when it is to end,
  • either the place of work or, where the employee is required or permitted to work at various places, an indication of that and of the address of the employer,
  • any collective agreements which directly affect the terms and conditions of the employment including, where the employer is not a party, the persons by whom they were made, and
  • where the employee is required to work outside the United Kingdom for a period of more than one month-
    • the period for which he is to work outside the United Kingdom,
    • the currency in which remuneration is to be paid while he is working outside the United Kingdom,
    • any additional remuneration payable to him, and any benefits to be provided to or in respect of him, by reason of his being required to work outside the United Kingdom, and
    • any terms and conditions relating to his return to the United Kingdom.
New rules oblige employment tribunals to award compensation to an employee if the employer has not provided written particulars of employment as required unless there are exceptional circumstances which would make an award or increase unjust or inequitable. This is not a free standing right and can only be claimed where the employee is bringing proceedings under specified employment tribunal jurisdictions, including unfair dismissal and all types of discrimination. A tribunal also has the power to confirm or amend particulars.

The compensation will normally be either 2 or 4 times a week's pay (a weeks pay is subject to a cap which is currently £310.00).

It is a criminal offence not to have a written record of the terms of company directors' service contracts, even if the director is the only shareholder in the company.

3. Changes to terms of employment

Negative changes in existing terms of employment are usually made in one of three ways:-

  • by agreement with the employee(s), possibly with a cash "sweetener";
  • by unilateral variation of contract terms (or of works rules applied by the contracts); or
  • by giving required notice to terminate existing contracts and offering new contracts on new terms.

    Choices open to an employee are:-

  • to go along with the employer's proposals;
  • to reject them and quit, perhaps claiming constructive dismissal , or
  • to reject them but continue to work on a without prejudice basis (ie "under protest") on the new terms, reserving all rights, negotiating if possible and ultimately bringing court or Tribunal proceedings if agreement cannot be reached.

    Changes should be discussed with employees in advance. Failure to do so will normally be unreasonable and be held against the employer in any court or Tribunal proceedings.

    The basic rule is that a unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment made by an employer without agreement of the employee is generally a breach of contract. In serious cases this can give the employee the right to resign and claim constructive dismissal. The civil courts will have jurisdiction as well as (or instead of) an employment tribunal and the civil courts have greater powers than tribunals to award compensation in breach of contract cases.

    Even a clause agreed by an employee giving the employer the right to make unilateral changes to contract terms or works rules will not give the employer a total freedom and an employee may still be able to claim constructive dismissal if the employer makes significant changes. Employers should take expert legal advice.

    Changes in terms of employment must be notified to employees within one month, or sometimes sooner if overseas work is involved. Employees should be made fully aware of, and accept, any detrimental changes to their terms of employment if the changes are to be legally binding. Acceptance can be inferred by the employee's conduct. (eg continuing to work without objecting to the change. A variation will not be binding if there is no consideration).

    If an employee does not accept the changes then provided they were reasonable changes his refusal to accept them might amount to "some other substantial reason" which if sufficiently important could be a potentially fair reason for dismissing the employee.

4. Age discrimination update

The main provisions of the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031:

  • make direct and indirect age discrimination illegal in employment unless objectively justified (including terms of recruitment, job-advertising, promotion and training;
  • make all retirement ages under 65 illegal unless objectively justified;
  • remove the current upper age limits for unfair dismissal rights and statutory redundancy payments
  • require employers to give proper consideration to an employee's request to continue working beyond retirement; and
  • require employers to give written notice to employees at least 6 months in advance of their intended retirement date.

Benefits which depend on length of service requirements of 5 years or less or which recognise and reward loyalty and experience and motivate staff will continue to be lawful and there will be exemptions for many age-based rules in occupational pension schemes. The regulations will not affect the age at which people can claim their state pension.

All age limits are being removed for statutory sick pay, statutory maternity pay, statutory adoption pay and statutory paternity pay.

5. Post-termination restrictive covenants

Generally, restrictive covenants are clearly in restraint of trade and so are contrary to public policy. This principle conflicts with another that contracts freely entered into should be enforced.

The courts resolve the resulting conflict of public policy principles by enforcing restrictive covenants after employment has ended only if they go no further than is reasonably required to protect the legitimate business interests (including goodwill, customer lists and trade secrets) of the employer.

Restrictive covenant clauses should usually be drafted so that each part can be construed independently of any other parts and this should be expressed to be the intention of the parties. It is also important that restrictive covenants should be "tailormade" to suit the individual circumstances of the particular individual.

There is a general rule that where an employer has behaved so badly towards his employee that the employee can treat his employment contract as at an end then, because the contract has been ended by his own fault, the employer cannot usually enforce any post-termination restrictive covenants it may have contained.

6. Summary of qualifying periods for employment rights

The following statutory employment rights are subject to completion of the following qualifying periods of continuous employment:

  • Unfair dismissal - normally one year but this is reduced to none in certain cases,  notably cases in which dismissal is automatically unfair.
  • Sex, Race and Disability discrimination - none
  • Written statement of reasons for dismissal - one year
  • Redundancy pay - two years.
  • Time off to look for other work or for training if under notice for redundancy - two years.
  • Written statement of employment terms - one month.
  • Written statement of changes in terms - one month.
  • Itemised pay statements - none
  • Pay if suspended on certain medical grounds - one month
  • Statutory Sick Pay - none
  • Time off for public duties - none
  • Not to be unjustifiable disciplined by a Trade Union - none
  • Not to be refused employment because of TU membership or non-membership or be victimised because of TU membership, non-membership or activities - none
  • Time off for TU officials for TU duties - none
  • Time off for TU activities - none
  • Right to job back after ''old style'' maternity leave - two years
  • Right to ''new style'' maternity leave - none
  • Statutory Maternity Pay - 26 weeks
  • Time off for ante-natal care - none
  • DSS redundancy pay on employer's insolvency - two years
  • DSS holiday etc pay on employer's insolvency - none
 


Page 4 of 5